skip to main | skip to sidebar
Global Labour Column Archive
  • HOME
    • ABOUT US
    • GLC ANTHOLOGIES
  • LINKS
    • RECOMMENDED SITES
    • DISCLAIMER
  • AUTHORS
  • GLOBAL BOARD
  • CONTACT
  • GLU
  • ICDD
  • Follow Us on Twitter
  • Tuesday, October 18, 2011

    The Costs of the Financial Crisis 2008/09: Governments are Paying the Tab

    Sebastian Dullien
    One could almost get the impression that the storyline of the global economic and financial crisis of 2008/9 is forgotten. Questions of bank regulation and financial sector oversight are hardly discussed in public anymore and legislative efforts to rein in speculative and highly risky activities seem to have petered out. Instead, the public debt crisis has taken center-stage. Around the world, discussion focuses on cut-ting public deficits, with a strong focus on cutting public expenditure and a secondary focus on raising general direct and indirect taxes. The debate has turned from one about obvious market failures, especially in financial markets, to one about alleged government failure. That is, governments spending much more than they take in as revenue and hence piling up increasingly unsustainable public debts.

    However, if one looks into the details of the development of the public debt in many of today’s crisis countries, it becomes clear that it is precisely the economic and financial crisis of 2008/9 which has put the debt levels onto an unsustainable path. Prior to the crisis, countries such as Spain or Ireland and probably even the United States were on a path of (or at least close to) fiscal sustainability. After the crisis, markets now question public finance sustainability even in countries such as France.
     
    In a study commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, we calculated the costs of the global financial and economic crisis for Germany, a country which is not a core crisis country, but is often revered for its resilience in the crisis and its rapid recovery afterwards. In this study, we tried to pin down the costs of the crisis for the economy as a whole as well as for different groups in the country such as wealth owners, wage earners and the government. Germany is an important case study here as it did not experience a real estate bubble prior to the crisis. One can thus argue that the crisis costs can be seen as being completely exogenous to the crisis.
     
    Computing the costs of the crisis is not as simple as one might think. It starts with the government sector. One cannot simply use the headline figures presented in the mainstream media on bank rescue packages and stimulus packages and add them up. Firstly large parts of the bank rescue packages have not been real costs to the governments. If a government gives a guarantee to a bank and the bank continues business without the government ever having to pitch in, this is not a real cost in the end. If a government injects capital in private banks and later sells off the shares again, only the net loss can be counted as a cost. If the government sells the shares for more than it has injected earlier (as has been the case for the Swiss measures to support the country’s large banks), there are no costs, but even profits. Only if the government has to inject money into the financial system in a way that it cannot recoup later, the injection has to be counted as a cost. Similarly, if a publicly owned financial institution has inferred losses, these are clearly net losses for the government. For these costs stemming either from direct losses of public banks or non-recoverable injections of public funds, we use the term direct costs of the crisis.
     
    Secondly, stimulus packages cannot completely be seen as net costs. If a government builds new highways or repairs public buildings in the crisis as a stimulus measure, it incurs expenditure, but at the same time the value of the public’s assets increases. Again, as long as the government does not overpay and does not build useless gimmicks such as pyramids, this spending is not a net cost.
     
    In contrast, tax cuts used to stimulate private spending might at least be net costs to the government; yet, if we are interested in the macroeconomic costs, we need to keep in mind that these tax cuts increase the disposable income of the private sector and hence are not net costs to the economy as a whole.
     
    Be that as it may, looking only at expenditure for stimulus packages and bank rescue packages misses an important part of the costs: The automatic fall in tax revenues caused by the recession and the automatic increases in expenditure stemming from such a crisis, that is, for unemployment compensation. We have called costs of lost government revenue or higher transfers of lost output indirect costs.
     
    Similarly, computing the costs for the private sector is not completely straightforward. If someone defaults on her mortgage and the value of mortgage backed securities falls, this is not necessarily a net cost to the economy. While the bank loses, the person defaulting on the mortgage might increase her net wealth. As long as both the debtor and the creditor are domestic, this does not change the net wealth of the economy. Only if the debtor is foreign, a default changes the net wealth of the country in question. However, just looking at losses in the financial markets again neglects important elements of the crisis costs: The loss of output and consequently wage and profit income of the private sector through the crisis. In parallel to the terms used for the public sector, the private sector has borne both direct and indirect costs of the crisis: Direct costs are those caused by a fall in the net value of assets. Indirect costs are income flows foregone due to the crisis.
     
    We calculated three scenarios: an optimistic rapid return to the old growth path; a slower return to the old growth path and a pessimistic scenario in which output never recovers to the pre-crisis growth path, but remains significantly below this path.
     
    By now, at least until the summer of 2011, the German economy has developed roughly in line with our most optimistic scenario. The scenario assumes a GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent in 2010 and 2.8 percent in 2011. However, at the time of writing, there are some signs that the recovery is seriously slowing down and a risk of a new recession is emerging. Thus, it is unlikely that the most optimistic recovery scenario continues. One can probably say that the most likely real-world development will be between our most optimistic and the medium scenario.
     
    Table 1 below presents the results of our computation. The first very interesting result is that indirect costs of the crisis dwarf direct costs. Total costs even in the most optimistic scenario are around €700bn, of which only a little less than €100bn are direct costs. In the less optimistic scenario, the ratio becomes €2154bn to €100bn. The second central result is that the government bears most of the crisis costs. Government revenue even in the most optimistic scenario (which now can be seen as the lower limit) has been hit by a total of €270bn or more than 10 percent of GDP. In the less optimistic scenario (which now can be seen as the upper limit), costs to the government even add up to about €800bn or more than 30 percent of current GDP. The third interesting element is that wage and transfer earners in Germany might not be quite as hard hit as sometimes feared. In the more optimistic scenario, their incomes are only reduced by €177bn, yet in the less optimistic scenario by €755bn. The low value for the optimistic scenario is probably a special feature only to be found in Germany and might be explained by the labour market policies during the crisis when the German government paid firms to keep workers on reduced hours instead of firing them (“Kurzarbeit”) which in turn led to a very low increase in unemployment in Germany during the crisis.
     
    In international comparisons, the costs in Germany can probably be seen as rather modest. Germany has experienced one of the most vigorous recoveries after the crisis. Yet, already in Germany, the crisis can be seen to have been responsible for a significant deterioration of public finances. Wealth owners, who can be seen of the main beneficiaries of a deregulated financial sector which has finally wreaked havoc with the economies of most advanced countries, in contrast, have only borne a comparatively modest part of the crisis costs.
     
    Table 1: Crisis costs for wage and transfer recipients, wealth owners and government in Germany

    This imbalance in bearing the crisis burden should be kept in mind when measures to rebalance the public accounts in the OECD countries are discussed. Wealth owners here should at least pay a fair share of the burden. Specifically, this means that the balance between spending cuts and tax increases and the specific changes to the tax codes which have been part of many austerity packages need to be re-thought. The first point here is that budgets should rather be balanced by tax increases than cuts in social security spending.
     
    Second, when taxes are increased, a focus should be on those types of taxes which are borne by people who have in the decades before benefited the most from deregulated financial markets: This would mean a focus on increasing taxes on interest and dividend income, capital gains and wealth. In addition, one should also increase the income tax rates in the top tax brackets as these individuals disproportionately benefit from the investment opportunities in deregulated financial markets. Last but not least, these numbers support a financial transaction tax as well as a financial activities tax: Both make financial transactions and financial intermediation slightly more expensive and will secure that society at least gets a small share back of the costs that irresponsible financial markets and financial institutions have incurred.

    Download this article as pdf

    Sebastian Dullien is Professor at HTW — University of Applied Science, Berlin. His extensive work on the financial crisis has recently been summarized in his book Decent Capitalism (published by Pluto Press in 2011, written with Hansjörg Herr and Christian Kellermann).

    Posted in: Financial Crisis
    Email This BlogThis! Share to X Share to Facebook
    Newer Post Older Post Home

    1 Comments:

    Edward Sussex says:
    November 7, 2011 at 5:55 PM Reply

    The analysis of this issue is needed to return the debate to the real issues facing the economy today.
    I generally agree with the conclusions, while having two questions regarding the methodology.
    One, the author correctly states: “If a government gives a guarantee to a bank and the bank continues business without the government ever having to pitch in, this is not a real cost in the end. If a government injects capital in private banks and later sells off the shares again, only the net loss can be counted as a cost.” Though that is true, it does not relieve the banking sector from the need for greater regulation or taxation. Although the government may not have to pay or may receive back money it has paid, it still has to take a risk of having to pay out or not being paid back. Bearing that risk may well increase the government’s borrowing costs while the risk still exists. Also, the financial establishment receives those guarantees or payments at lower-than-market prices, with the public sector covering the difference.
    Two, the author states: “stimulus packages cannot completely be seen as net costs. If a government builds new highways or repairs public buildings in the crisis as a stimulus measure, it incurs expenditure, but at the same time the value of the public’s assets increases. Again, as long as the government does not overpay and does not build useless gimmicks such as pyramids, this spending is not a net cost.” This is an argument that I often make in answering those who say that we are irresponsibly creating a debt burden for the next generation. The point is that the new infrastructure will survive us, so it is not unreasonable for the next generation to share in the costs. Also, I would be happy to be rich enough to, on my death, leave my children some government bonds, so that they can inherit not only costs of but also income from today’s infrastructure investment.
    On the other hand, it does seem to me that such additional government spending to counter the recession should be included in the computation of the recession-induced current government deficit. And I can’t see why, in that respect, a difference should be made between such discretionary stimulus spending and, on the other hand, the non-discretionary government expenditure and loss of revenue caused by the automatic stabilisers.
    In sum, I suspect that the direct government costs are higher than calculated by the author.

    Post a Comment

    Share

    Twitter Facebook Stumbleupon Favorites More

    Subscribe to the Mailing List

    If you want to subscribe to the GLC mailing list, please click here or send an empty email to "List-GLColumn-subscribe@global-labour-university.org"

    Contribute to the GLC

    If you want to contribute to the Global Labour Column, please read here the Guidelines for Contributions

    Languages






    Donations

    More Info

    Popular Posts

      T-Shirt Economics: Labour in the Imperialist World Economy
      Chinese Construction Companies in Africa: A Challenge for Trade Unions
      Ruskin, the trade union college, is under siege

    TAGS

    Trade Unions Financial Crisis Workers' rights Globalisation Neoliberalism Labour Market Collective Bargaining Decent Work Inequality Labour Standards Wage Social Movements Europe Development Strategies Struggle Progressive alliances Strike Growth Labour Labour rights Financial Market Tax Financial Regulation Social Security Public Investment Social Democracy South Africa Economic Democracy Fiscal Space Germany Informal Economy Corporate Governance Freedom of Association ILO Minimum Wage United States Competitiveness Human Rights Labour Movements Trade Union Austerity Central Bank Environment Free Trade Free Trade Agreement Greece Labour Movement Social Protection State Funding Transnational Solidarity Unemployment Vietnam Workers’ Rights Crowd Work Domestic Workers Economic Crisis Education Employment Forced Labour France Global Warming Labour Market Flexibility Labour Statistics Migration National Minimum Wage Public Works Programmes Trade Union Divisions Workers' unity Agriculture Brexit Care Work Construction Sector Cooperatives Crisis Economic Alternatives Economic Reform Farmworkers Financialisation Globalization Indonesia Just Transition Labour Process Liberalisation Macroeconomic Policy NUM Nationalism Occupational Health Organising Outsourcing Portugal Privatisation Refugees Regulation Reserve Army of Labour Right to strike Social Dialogue Social Justice Solidarity Tax Evasion Welfare State Workers Rights Workers’ Organisations AMCU Africa Alternative Sources of Power Anti-privatisation Anti-union Violence Automobiles Brazil Business and Human Rights Capital Flight Capitalism Chinese Investment Climate Change Collectivity Colombia Community Monitoring Conference Corporate Transparency Coup Cuba Debt Restructuring Decriminalisation Demand Democracy Developed and Developing Countries Development Digitisation Disciplining of the superfluous labour force Domestic Work Economic Development Egypt Elections Entrepreneurship Eurozone Crisis Executive Compensation Factory Occupations Fair Trade Farm Workers Feminism Finance Financial Crises Financial Innovation Financial crisis. Fiscal Austerity Food Sovereignty G20 Gender Gentrification Global Health Global Multiplier Great Depression Great Recession Hawkers Health Hotel Housekeepers Human Rights due Diligence India Industrial Relations Informal Employment Institutions International Aid Policy International Framework Agreements Investment Partnership (TTIP) Investment Partnerships Iran Korean Shipbuilding Industry Kuznets Labor Labour Broking Labour Income Share Labour Markets Labour Reform Leadership Left Legislation Loi Travail Macroeconomic Performance Management Manufacturing Marshall Plan Metal Workers Migrant Domestic Workers Militarised Capitalism Mineworkers NASVI National Health Service Neolibaralism Networking New Progressive Consensus Online Campaigning Options for the Euro Area Paternalism Patriarchy Pensions Performance Standards Political Alliances Poverty Reduction Precariousness Prison Labour Prisoners Private Plantations Progressive Tax Reform Protectionism Protests Public Policy Quebec Racism Rank-and-File Member Redistribution Regulation of Labour Rent Seeking Rural Development Ruskin SEWA Securitization Sex Work Shadow Banking Shaft Stewards Social Audit Social Development Social Movement Social Transformation Solidarity Economy Spain Sportswear Industry State Stellenbosch Street Trading Street Vendors Strike Ban Strikes Structural Changes Supply Chains Swedish Model Tertiary Education Top Income Shares Tourism Trade Liberalisation Trade Misinvoicing Transatlantic Trade Transformation Transparency Transport Trump Tunsia Turkey Unfree Labour Union 4.0 Union Strategy Unions Universal Health Coverage (UHC) Voluntary Initiatives Wage Employment Wage Inequality Wage Share West Africa Wild Cat Strike Winelands Women Women’s Movement Workers` Organization Youth

    PUBLICATIONS

    Click here to view more

    Blog Archive

    • ►  2020 (1)
      • ►  September (1)
    • ►  2017 (40)
      • ►  December (4)
      • ►  November (2)
      • ►  October (3)
      • ►  September (5)
      • ►  July (4)
      • ►  June (6)
      • ►  May (4)
      • ►  April (3)
      • ►  March (2)
      • ►  February (4)
      • ►  January (3)
    • ►  2016 (34)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (2)
      • ►  October (2)
      • ►  September (4)
      • ►  August (4)
      • ►  July (2)
      • ►  June (3)
      • ►  May (4)
      • ►  April (1)
      • ►  March (4)
      • ►  February (3)
      • ►  January (2)
    • ►  2015 (32)
      • ►  December (2)
      • ►  November (5)
      • ►  October (4)
      • ►  September (2)
      • ►  August (1)
      • ►  July (2)
      • ►  June (5)
      • ►  May (3)
      • ►  April (2)
      • ►  March (2)
      • ►  February (3)
      • ►  January (1)
    • ►  2014 (32)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (1)
      • ►  October (4)
      • ►  September (3)
      • ►  August (1)
      • ►  July (3)
      • ►  June (6)
      • ►  May (2)
      • ►  April (3)
      • ►  March (2)
      • ►  February (2)
      • ►  January (2)
    • ►  2013 (41)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (2)
      • ►  October (5)
      • ►  September (4)
      • ►  August (1)
      • ►  July (4)
      • ►  June (3)
      • ►  May (4)
      • ►  April (3)
      • ►  March (4)
      • ►  February (4)
      • ►  January (4)
    • ►  2012 (35)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (4)
      • ►  October (4)
      • ►  September (2)
      • ►  August (2)
      • ►  July (2)
      • ►  June (2)
      • ►  May (4)
      • ►  April (3)
      • ►  March (3)
      • ►  February (4)
      • ►  January (2)
    • ▼  2011 (39)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (4)
      • ▼  October (3)
        • Contesting a ‘just transition to a low carbon econ...
        • The Costs of the Financial Crisis 2008/09: Governm...
        • Summer days on Utøya
      • ►  September (4)
      • ►  August (3)
      • ►  July (2)
      • ►  June (3)
      • ►  May (3)
      • ►  April (4)
      • ►  March (4)
      • ►  February (4)
      • ►  January (2)
    • ►  2010 (39)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (5)
      • ►  October (4)
      • ►  September (2)
      • ►  August (2)
      • ►  July (3)
      • ►  June (4)
      • ►  May (1)
      • ►  April (4)
      • ►  March (4)
      • ►  February (4)
      • ►  January (3)
    • ►  2009 (5)
      • ►  December (3)
      • ►  November (2)

     
    Copyright © 2011 Global Labour Column Archive | Powered by Blogger
    Design by Free WordPress Themes | Bloggerized by Lasantha - Premium Blogger Themes | 100 WP Themes